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Affordable Housing: Plenty of Demand, But No Supply
to Be Found
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, access to affordable housing 1 has become
an increasingly important issue for those individuals lower on the
socioeconomic spectrum. 2 The 2008 financial crisis and ensuing
recession led to significant reductions in construction of new housing,
especially housing suitable for low- and moderate-income households. 3
As a result, demand for housing that low- and moderate-income
Americans can actually afford has significantly outpaced supply,
resulting in rising home and rent prices nationwide. 4
With the 2020 Presidential election looming, the American
housing market has become an area of intense political focus, and
affordable housing is now a key part of the Democratic party platform. 5
Several prominent Democratic politicians proposed plans to increase
access to affordable housing among the most vulnerable and underserved
groups. 6 Two commonly proposed solutions are: (1) down payment
assistance programs for low- and moderate-income 7 households and (2)
1. Housing is generally considered affordable when total monthly housing expense does
not exceed 30% of total monthly household income. CHRISTOPHER HERBERT ET AL., JOINT
CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., MEASURING HOUSING AFFORDABILITY:
ASSESSING
THE
30
PERCENT
OF
INCOME
STANDARD
2
(2018),
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/Harvard_JCHS_Herbert_Hermann_McCue_
measuring_housing_affordability.pdf [https://perma.cc/MV3M-RZSE].
2. SUSAN K. URAHN & TRAVIS PLUNKETT, PEW CHARITABLE TRS., AMERICAN FAMILIES
FACE A GROWING RENT BURDEN
4
(2018),
https://www.pewtrusts.org//media/assets/2018/04/rent-burden_report_v2.pdf [https://perma.cc/P59U-J5QT].
3. MARK ZANDI, MOODY’S ANALYTICS, ADDRESSING THE AFFORDABLE HOUSING CRISIS
1
(2018),
https://www.economy.com/getlocal?q=867546e8-545c-4f78-b1c57fd90908dc6d&app=eccafile [https://perma.cc/MZ3J-PXQN].
4. See URAHN & PLUNKETT, supra note 2 (describing the increased demand for rental
properties as the primary driver behind higher rent prices).
5. See generally Jacob Passy, Where the 2020 Presidential Candidates, Including
Elizabeth Warren and Bernie Sanders, Stand on Affordable Housing, MKT. WATCH (Sept. 19,
2019),
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/heres-where-2020-presidential-candidatesincluding-elizabeth-warren-and-kamala-harris-stand-on-affordable-housing-2019-07-25
[https://perma.cc/HV4S-WU8F] (summarizing candidates’ affordable housing proposals).
6. See id. (summarizing candidates’ affordable housing proposals).
7. Income categories are expressed in terms of area median income (AMI): low-income
is less than 80% of AMI, moderate-income is between 80% and 120% of AMI, and high-
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competitive grant programs tied to reform of local land-use regulations. 8
These proposals seek to impact the housing market in opposing ways:
down payment assistance would shift existing rental demand to home
purchases, 9 while competitive grant programs aim to boost housing
development, both for rental and owner occupancy, by simplifying
zoning restrictions and lowering development costs. 10
This Note examines these two proposals designed to address
housing affordability and improve economic opportunity for low- and
moderate-income Americans in light of the housing market’s current state
and the historical developments that led to it. Part II details the pre-crisis
developments that led to peak homeownership in 2006, the post-financial
crisis developments in the national housing market, and the insufficient
supply of affordable housing today. 11 Part III discusses current proposals
for down payment assistance and competitive grant programs tied to landuse restriction reduction. 12 Part IV analyzes the practicality of both
proposals given costs and existing regulatory constraints. 13 Part V
evaluates the relative advantages and disadvantages of each and
recommends implementation of policies like the competitive grant
proposals that target housing supply rather than demand. 14

income is greater than 120% of AMI. Archana Pradhan, Expiration of the CFPB’s Qualified
Mortgage “GSE Patch” – Part 3, CORELOGIC: INSIGHTS BLOG fig.2 (July 26, 2019),
https://www.corelogic.com/blog/2019/07/expiration-of-the-cfpbs-qualified-mortgage-gsepatch-part-3.aspx [https://perma.cc/96W9-T4GR].
8. See generally Passy, supra note 5 (summarizing candidates’ affordable housing
proposals).
9. See URAHN & PLUNKETT, supra note 2, at 8 (discussing the impact of slower rates of
conversion from renting to homeownership on the increase in rent prices).
10. See Jason Furman, Chairman, Council of Econ. Advisers, Address at The Urban
Institute: Barriers to Shared Growth: The Case of Land Use Regulation and Economic Rents
2
(Nov.
20,
2015),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/20151120_barriers_share
d_growth_land_use_regulation_and_economic_rents.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S47Y-TQZS]
(describing zoning and land-use restrictions as a supply constraint).
11. See infra Part II.
12. See infra Part III.
13. See infra Part IV.
14. See infra Part V.
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II. BACKGROUND
A.

Pre-Crisis Credit Expansion

An economic catastrophe on the scale of the 2008 financial crisis
and subsequent recession never truly has a single cause, but most
acknowledge the collapse of the early 2000s housing bubble as the
primary catalyst of the crisis. 15 Over the decades leading up to the
financial crisis, innovative financial products 16 and legislative changes 17
led to a dramatic expansion of credit. 18 This put homeownership within
reach for more Americans than ever before and fundamentally changed
the housing market, culminating in record homeownership rates 19 and
home prices. 20
Historically, federal policy has promoted homeownership, 21
which many consider key to the “American Dream.” 22 Indeed, the federal
government dutifully created the infrastructure for the modern mortgage
market to help maximize homeownership in the United States. 23
15. See Neil Fligstein & Adam Goldstein, The Transformation of Mortgage Finance and
the Industrial Roots of the Mortgage Meltdown 5 (Inst. for Research on Labor and Emp’t,
Working Paper No. 133-12, 2012), https://www.irle.berkeley.edu/files/2012/TheTransformation-of-Mortgage-Finance-and-the-Industrial-Roots-of-the-MortgageMeltdown.pdf [https://perma.cc/2V8Q-WDX6] [hereinafter Transformation of Mortgage
Finance] (listing the fall in housing prices and rise in foreclosures as the cause of the financial
crisis).
16. For instance, securitization transactions became an integral part of the expansion of
the subprime mortgage market, beginning in the 1990s and even spanning beyond the 2008
financial crisis. See, e.g., FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N., THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY
REPORT 68 (2011), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6ZEP-EBR4] (describing expansion of mortgage securitizations in the
1990s to include subprime loans).
17. See, e.g., Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970 (“EHFA”) § 201, 12 U.S.C. § 1717
(2018) (permitting Fannie Mae to purchase mortgages without federal insurance); id. § 305,
12 U.S.C. § 1454 (permitting Freddie Mac to purchase mortgages without federal insurance).
18. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N., supra note 16, at 83 (describing the expansion of credit
in early 2000s to households previously unable to access it).
19. Id. at 9 (listing unprecedented credit expansion as a driving force behind the
increasing rate of homeownership, which peaked in 2004).
20. See id. at 214 (describing the 2006 peak of the American housing market).
21. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 163(h)(3) (2018) (authorizing deduction of qualified residential
mortgage interest to be deducted from a homeowner’s taxable income).
22. See Andrea J. Boyack, Equitably Housing (Almost) Half a Nation of Renters, 65
BUFF. L. REV. 109, 110 (2017) (describing need for rent-friendly policy alternatives to typical
“American Dream of homeownership” based policies).
23. See Neil Fligstein & Adam Goldstein, The Anatomy of the Mortgage Securitization
Crisis 13–14 (Inst. for Research on Labor and Emp’t, Working Paper No. 200-10, 2010),
https://irle.berkeley.edu/files/2010/The-Anatomy-of-the-Mortgage-Securitization-Crisis.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YX66-PUJR] [hereinafter Anatomy of the Mortgage Securitization Crisis]
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Congress established the Federal National Mortgage Association
(“Fannie Mae”) in 1938, 24 the Government National Mortgage
Association (“Ginnie Mae”) in 1968, 25 and finally the Federal Home
Loan Mortgage Corporation (“Freddie Mac”) in 1970. 26 These entities
encouraged the growth of mortgage lending throughout the late-1900s by
purchasing mortgages from originators and creating a secondary market
for the loans, thereby providing originators with more funds for further
lending. 27 Ginnie Mae is wholly owned by the federal government and
operates as part of the Department of Housing and Urban Development. 28
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are private corporations, 29 but their federal
charters provide that both “have an affirmative obligation to facilitate the
financing of affordable housing for low- and moderate-income
families.” 30 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac receive governmental backing
through lines of credit from the U.S. Treasury, tax exemptions, and
payment clearing services. 31 Additionally, securities issued by both
entities receive preferential capital treatment under banking regulations, 32
which incentivizes financial institutions to purchase them and ensures
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac low borrowing costs to finance their

(describing the Johnson administration’s focus on increasing homeownership and its efforts
to stimulate the housing market).
24. Fannie Mae was chartered as a federal agency in 1938 to help facilitate the purchase
and sale of federally insured mortgages. Erica Santos, Recent Development, VIII. Fannie
Mae & Freddie Mac: Release from Conservatorship, 36 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 92, 92
(2016). Fannie Mae was subsequently privatized in 1968 but retained government
sponsorship. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 (“HUDA”) § 801, 12 U.S.C. §
1716b (2018).
25. HUDA § 801, 12 U.S.C. § 1716b.
26. Freddie Mac was created in 1970 to purchase home mortgages from both federal
agencies and private financial institutions. Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970 (“EHFA”)
§ 305, 12 U.S.C. § 1454 (2018).
27. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N., supra note 16, at 38.
28. Ginnie Mae, operating under the Department of Housing and Urban Development,
works to promote homeownership and facility liquidity in the mortgage market by
guaranteeing principal and interest payments from mortgage-backed securities comprised of
eligible loans to make these securities more attractive to investors. Julia Kagan, Government
National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae), INVESTOPEDIA (May 5, 2019),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/ginniemae.asp [https://perma.cc/XW5J-752M].
29. Kenneth W. Dam, The Subprime Crisis and Financial Regulation: International and
Comparative Perspectives, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 581, 595 (2010).
30. 12 U.S.C. § 4501(7) (2018).
31. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N., supra note 16, at 39.
32. 12 C.F.R. § 167.6(a)(1) (2019) (assigning a 20% risk weight to Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac issued securities, including mortgage-backed securities, and a 50% risk weight
to private label MBS for the purpose of financial institutions calculating their capital under
existing requirements).
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mortgage purchases. 33 Due to this hybrid structure, where both entities
are privately owned yet have public obligations and receive substantial
government support, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are considered
government-sponsored entities (“GSEs”). 34
Originally, Fannie Mae only purchased home mortgages insured
by federal agencies, such as the Federal Housing Administration
(“FHA”). 35 The Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970 authorized both
GSEs to purchase mortgages that lacked federal insurance. 36 The GSEs’
purchases expanded to “conforming mortgages,” which are uninsured,
fixed-rate mortgages in compliance with their respective underwriting
and size guidelines. 37 The GSEs earned profit for their private owners by
holding purchased mortgages in their portfolios to collect interest and
principal payments or by selling loans to other investors. 38 Instead of
selling individual mortgages, the GSEs collected large pools of
mortgages, issued “mortgage-backed securities” (“MBS”), and sold
pieces to investors, who collected a share of principal and interest
payments generated by the underlying loans. 39 Further regulatory
changes, such as the imposition of more stringent capital requirements on
savings and loan associations during the 1980s, 40 encouraged lenders to
sell more of their conforming mortgages to the GSEs, who in turn
packaged and issued greater numbers of MBS. 41 The GSEs’ ability to
purchase and securitize these massive amounts of mortgages was aided
in large part by their comparatively lenient loss reserve requirements:
0.45% of guaranteed MBS and 2.5% of portfolio mortgages, compared to
the 4% of portfolio mortgages required for thrifts. 42

33. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N., supra note 16, at 39.
34. See Dam, supra note 29, at 594–95 (describing governmental support provided to

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which allows the entities to borrow at low interest rates).
35. Santos, supra note 24.
36. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
37. Transformation of Mortgage Finance, supra note 15, at 17.
38. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N., supra note 16, at 38–39.
39. Id. at 39.
40. See, e.g., Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989
(“FIRREA”), Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 101, 103 Stat. 183, 187 (1989) (stating in Section 101(2)
that one purpose of the bill is “[t]o improve the supervision of savings associations by
strengthening capital . . . and other supervisory standards”).
41. Anatomy of the Mortgage Securitization Crisis, supra note 23, at 15–16 (explaining
that savings and loan associations sold greater numbers of portfolio mortgages in order to
meet new capital requirements).
42. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N., supra note 16, at 39.
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While the GSEs dominated securitization of conforming
mortgages, private institutions, such as commercial and investment
banks, spearheaded securitization of adjustable-rate mortgages and other
nonconforming mortgages 43 the GSEs could not purchase. 44 These
“private label” securities 45 frequently included riskier nonconforming
and nonprime mortgages made to less creditworthy borrowers, who in
return paid higher interest rates on their debt. 46 Like a GSE MBS, private
label MBS contain multiple “tranches” with different payment priorities,
where “senior” tranches receive principal and interest payments first,
before payments flow down to more “junior” tranches. 47 In the event that
cash flows from the underlying mortgages are insufficient to satisfy all
obligations—due to pre-payments or delinquencies—investors in junior
tranches experience a default before the senior tranches that enjoy greater
insulation. 48 To compensate for the different degrees of credit risk, each
tranche carries a different interest rate, with junior tranches paying higher
interest rates than more senior tranches. 49 Private label MBS appealed to
many investors by allowing them to purchase the tranche that met their
risk tolerance and providing higher returns than securities with similar
risk profiles. 50
As they lacked the same implicit government guarantee and
included less creditworthy, nonprime mortgages, private label MBS were
considered riskier than those issued by the GSEs. 51 However, investors
could partially mitigate credit risk by purchasing a credit default swap
(“CDS”), which functioned like an insurance policy on the private label
43. Nonconforming mortgages are ineligible for purchase and securitization by the GSEs
because they fail to meet minimum down payment, minimum borrower credit score,
maximum size, or other underwriting requirements. Julia Kagan, Nonconforming Mortgage,
INVESTOPEDIA (June 13, 2018), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/non_conforming.asp
[https://perma.cc/9V8F-HMTD].
44. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N., supra note 16.
45. Private label MBS are securitized pools of mortgages packaged by private issuers and
are not issued or guaranteed by the GSEs. Id. at 105.
46. Transformation of Mortgage Finance, supra note 15, at 17 (describing the riskier
nature of private label mortgage backed securities and the higher returns they paid due to
lower credit quality of their underlying loans).
47. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N., supra note 16, at 43.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See Transformation of Mortgage Finance, supra note 15, at 27 (describing pre-crisis
perception that the high rates paid by AAA rated tranches of private label MBS made them
one of the best investments available).
51. See id. at 16–17 (describing the perception that GSE MBS had the implicit backing
of the federal government and were safer investments as a result).
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MBS. 52 The CDS buyer paid periodic premiums, expressed as a
percentage of the security’s value, to the seller in exchange for the
promise to receive the face value of the underlying security in the event
of a covered default, effectively shifting credit risk to the CDS seller. 53
Private label securities also offered higher returns than the low-rate GSE
securities, which made them attractive to many investors. 54 More MBS
investors entered the private label market after origination of conforming
mortgages dropped roughly 50% in 2004 from their 2003 peak, while
issuance of GSE MBS that contained these mortgages dropped even more
substantially. 55 As demand for private label MBS grew, lenders
expanded originations of riskier, nonconforming mortgages they sold to
banks for securitization. 56 Nonconforming mortgage origination grew
rapidly, from 30% of all overall mortgage lending between 1990 and
2003, to 70% in 2006. 57 More than $1 trillion of nonconforming
mortgages were securitized in both 2005 and 2006, up from just $100
billion in 2001, 58 and the value of private label MBS issuances exceeded
that of GSE MBS. 59
Securitization expanded mortgage credit to less creditworthy
borrowers, who were especially vulnerable to an economic downturn. 60
Home prices peaked in April 2006, and from that point sales slowed. 61
Early default rates of nonconforming mortgages accelerated during
2006 62 and unsold home inventory rose further. 63 Unemployment
52. See Anatomy of the Mortgage Securitization Crisis, supra note 23, at 23–24
(describing how a CDS allowed investors to insure the securities they held).
53. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N., supra note 16, at 50.
54. Id. at 43.
55. Anatomy of the Mortgage Securitization Crisis, supra note 23, at 25 (comparing the
roughly to $2.6 trillion of conforming mortgages originated in 2003 compared just $1.35
trillion originated in 2004).
56. See Transformation of Mortgage Finance, supra note 15, at 23–24 (describing the
substantial increase in nonconforming mortgage origination during the early 2000s).
57. Id. at 24.
58. Id.
59. SEC. INDUS. AND FIN. MKT. ASS’N, US MORTGAGE-RELATED ISSUANCE AND
OUTSTANDING tbl.2.1 (2019), https://www.sifma.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/sf-usmortgage-related-sifma.xls [https://perma.cc/8RZG-HSDJ] (stating that $1.26 and $1.28
trillion of non-agency/private label MBS were issued in 2005 and 2006 respectively compared
with $995.6 and $903.7 billion of agency MBS in the same years).
60. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N., supra note 16, at 389 (“As the housing bubble
deflated, families that had counted on rising housing values for cash and retirement security
became anchored to mortgages that exceeded the declining value of their homes.”).
61. Id. at 214.
62. Transformation of Mortgage Finance, supra note 15, at 35.
63. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N., supra note 16, at 233.
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skyrocketed, and the United States officially entered a recession in late
2007. 64 The nation’s economic woes caused a sharp increase in the
number of homeowners who either abandoned their homes 65 or defaulted
on their mortgages, leading to foreclosure. 66 Many homeowners found
their mortgages “underwater” and owed more on their mortgages than
their homes were worth, which led some to voluntarily turn their homes
over to their mortgage lender. 67 By 2008, the serious delinquency rates
jumped for all types of mortgages 68 and put significant financial pressure
on MBS issuers, who retained pieces of the securities. 69 Ultimately, the
resulting strain forced the GSEs into conservatorship 70 and led to massive
losses and even the failures of some private label MBS issuers. 71 As
unsold inventory continued to increase, the housing bubble finally
popped, sending home prices tumbling across the country. 72 Excess
supply made new residential construction unprofitable for builders and
development virtually ground to a stop. 73
B.

Current Housing Dynamics

In comparison to low- and moderate-income households, highincome households were not impacted as severely by the recessionary
deflation in home prices, largely because home equity makes up a smaller

64. Id. at 390.
65. Many homeowners that lost their jobs during the financial crisis found themselves

unable to make their mortgage payments or sell the properties due to the drop in value. Before
defaulting outright, some homeowners turned over the properties directly to their lenders. Id.
at 389.
66. See URAHN & PLUNKETT, supra note 2, at 8 (stating that eight to ten million homes
were foreclosed on during the recession and that less than a third of those households are
expected to own homes again).
67. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N., supra note 16, at 404 (“Many mortgage holders
find themselves underwater; that is, owing more than their homes are worth.”).
68. Id. at 218 fig.11.2.
69. See Anatomy of the Mortgage Securitization Crisis, supra note 23, at 30–31
(describing how, as mortgage default rates grew, the value of MBS held by financial
institutions decreased).
70. Santos, supra note 24, at 97.
71. Anatomy of the Mortgage Securitization Crisis, supra note 23, at 30–31.
72. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N., supra note 16, at 214–15 (describing the peak of
housing prices in 2006, the fall in sales rate, the subsequent increase in housing stock for sale,
and finally, the drop in prices).
73. See ZANDI, supra note 3 (“Homebuilding collapsed during the housing crash a decade
ago and has been slow to recover.”).
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percentage of their overall net worth. 74 High-income households on
average derive larger portions of their net worth from equity investments
than their low- and moderate-income counterparts, and on the back of the
post-crisis stock market rally, wealthier households recovered much more
quickly than others. 75 As a result, demand for higher-cost housing
increased and made construction viable again fairly quickly. 76 The postcrisis recovery reached low- and moderate-income households much
later, and until recently, potential profits from construction of new, lowercost housing for rent and owner occupancy were insufficient to induce
developers to invest in these units. 77
Over the past decade, developers focused on construction of highcost housing and produced fewer affordable housing units than in the
past. 78 Since 2013, completions of large homes marketed to high-income
households outpaced smaller, more affordable homes. 79 Conversely,
with significantly more low- and moderate-income households than highincome households nationwide, 80 demand for affordable housing
consistently outstrips the meager increases in supply, resulting in
nationwide shortages. 81 The overall homeownership rate among
Americans has also decreased significantly, dropping from an overall
high of 69% in 2004 82 to 64.4% in 2018. 83 While homeowners still
outnumber renters, the number of renter households increased at roughly
74. Moritz Kuhn et al., Research: How the Financial Crisis Drastically Increased Wealth
Inequality in the U.S., HARV. BUS. REV. (Sept. 13, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/09/researchhow-the-financial-crisis-drastically-increased-wealth-inequality-in-the-u-s
[https://perma.cc/ZW8P-AVTJ].
75. Id.
76. ZANDI, supra note 3 (discussing the post-crisis recovery among higher-income
households).
77. Id. (describing the more the recent recovery from the 2008 financial crisis for lowand moderate-income households).
78. See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., THE STATE OF THE NATION’S
HOUSING
2019,
at
8
(2019),
https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/Harvard_JCHS_State_of_the_Nations_Hous
ing_2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/4G6A-GLRT] (“[S]mall homes under 1,800 square feet
represented just 22 percent of single-family completions, down from 32 percent on average
in 1999–2011.”).
79. Id. (stating the completion rate of homes with more than 3000 square feet first
outpaced that of homes with less than 1800 square feet in 2013 and the trend has continued
through 2018).
80. See id. at 40 (showing in 2017, roughly 48.1 million households had incomes of
$75,000 or more while more than 62% of households had incomes of less than $75,000).
81. ZANDI, supra note 3.
82. URAHN & PLUNKETT, supra note 2.
83. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., supra note 78, at 2.

426

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 24

double the rate of home owners between 2001 and 2017. 84 This shift
toward renting has carried across demographic and income divides. 85 In
the post-crisis era, households are transitioning from renting to
homeownership at significantly lower rates than before the financial
crisis, with only 13% of renter households transitioning to
homeownership between 2009 and 2015, compared to 20% between 2001
and 2005. 86
Some observers cite changing preferences among younger
households as a significant driver behind the increase in renting at the
expense of homeownership; however, research suggests the majority of
younger renters, aged eighteen to thirty-four, aspire to homeownership
but feel that it is beyond their financial reach. 87 The inability to qualify
for a mortgage or afford rising home prices forces many younger
households to rent rather than buy. 88 While Americans between the ages
of eighteen and thirty-four still make up the single largest age group of
renters, those over the age of fifty-five fuel new demand for rentals even
further. 89
The increased number of households relying on renting versus
owning, coupled with insufficient construction of housing to meet this
new demand, resulted in a nationwide increase in rent prices. 90 Indeed,
the number of rental units available for under $800 per month decreased
by roughly 4 million between 2011 and 2017, a 17% drop. 91 As of 2018,
units renting for less than $850 made up only 4% of all those in new
unsubsidized multifamily buildings, while those renting for less than
84. See id. at 40 (detailing an 18.5% increase in renters from 2001 to 2017 compared to
a 9.71% increase in homeowners over the same period).
85. See URAHN & PLUNKETT, supra note 2 (analyzing increased rental participation
among eighteen to thirty-five and fifty-five plus age groups); JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES
OF HARVARD UNIV., supra note 78, at 25 (stating that more than 25% of households with
annual incomes of at least $75,000 rented housing in 2018 compared with only 19% in 2008).
86. URAHN & PLUNKETT, supra note 2.
87. Id. (describing results of a 2016 Pew Research Center public in which 57% of renters
aged eighteen to thirty-four expressed the desire to own a home but were unable to qualify for
mortgage financing).
88. See id. (stating that 57% of renters aged eighteen to thirty-four reported being unable
to qualify for a mortgage).
89. See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., supra note 78, at 25
(describing the increase in households over the age of fifty-five as renters, which, as of 2018,
make up over 25% of all renters compared to eighteen to thirty-four year old renters, which
make up 38%).
90. URAHN & PLUNKETT, supra note 2, at 4 (“The steadily rising demand for rental
properties over the past decade has reduced vacancy rates to near historic lows, fueling a rapid
increase in rental market prices that has outpaced household incomes for many families.”).
91. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., supra note 78, at 29.
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$1050 made up just 9% of the total. 92 According to the Joint Center for
Housing Studies of Harvard University, analysts generally consider
housing costs of 30% or less of income “affordable,” and classify those
spending more than 30% monthly as “cost-burdened.” 93 As of 2018, the
median annual income for renter households was only $40,530, 94 making
$1013 the cost-burden threshold for the median income renter
household. 95
Higher rent prices drive the significant increases in the proportion
of cost-burdened renters nationwide. 96 Cost-burdened renters face a
significantly bleaker financial situation than their non-burdened
counterparts, with the median value of savings among cost-burdened
renters at roughly $10, while that of non-burdened renters is over
$1000. 97 Cost burden has long been prevalent among the lowest income
households, but with higher rent prices, larger numbers of moderateincome households also became cost-burdened in recent years. 98 In 2017,
nearly half of all renter households were cost-burdened. 99 With steady
increases in net new renter households projected for the near future and
residential construction consistently lagging demand, rent prices are
likely to increase further. 100
Along with the price of rent, average home prices also increased
significantly nationwide to rival the pre-crisis peak. 101 As the nation
emerged from recession, property values recovered more quickly than

Id. at 29–30.
HERBERT ET AL., supra note 1.
JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., supra note 78, at 26.
See id. (listing the 2018 median annual income of renter households as $40,530);
HERBERT ET AL., supra note 1 (providing 30% of monthly income as a proxy for housing
affordability, multiplied this figure by $40,530 to calculate the cost burden threshold for a
median income renter).
96. See URAHN & PLUNKETT, supra note 2, at 4 (describing the approximate 19% increase
in the number of cost-burdened rental households between 2001 and 2015).
97. Id. at 13–14 (describing the median value of savings among cost-burdened and noncost-burdened renters as of 2015).
98. See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., supra note 78, at 4 (listing a
4.6% increase in cost burden among renter households with incomes of $30,000 to $44,999
and a 2.9% increase among those with incomes of $45,000 to $74,999 between 2011 and
2017).
99. Id. (stating that “47.4 percent of renter households remained cost-burdened”).
100. See id. at 3 (“[E]stimates show an uptick in early 2019, in keeping with Joint Center
projections of about 400,000 net new renter households annually over the coming decade.”).
101. Id. at 2 (stating that the FHFA Home Price Index was just 2% below its 2006 high at
the end of 2018).
92.
93.
94.
95.
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incomes. 102 The ratio of median home price to median household
income, a common measure of housing affordability and an indicator of
the difficulty to save for a down payment, rose from its 2011 low of 3.3
to 4.1 in 2018. 103 While this data suggests that increasing home prices
make housing less affordable to the median-income American, cost
burden among homeowners decreased by 8% between 2010 and 2017. 104
These two seemingly conflicting facts suggest that recent home purchases
are primarily attributable to higher-income households, as fewer
purchasers spend more than 30% of their income on monthly payments
for these high-cost properties. 105
III. PROPOSALS
Ahead of the forthcoming election in November 2020, affordable
housing has become an increasingly politically charged issue. 106
Prominent Democratic politicians, including Senators Elizabeth Warren,
Kamala Harris, and Cory Booker, proposed plans designed to improve
access to affordable housing. 107 Two common schemes to boost housing
affordability are (1) down payment assistance programs 108 to aid low- and
moderate-income households in purchasing homes, and (2) competitive
grant programs 109 designed to ease local land-use restrictions, decrease

102. See id. (stating that the ratio of median home price to median household income
increased from a low of 3.3 in 2011 to 4.1 in 2018).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 4.
105. See id. (describing the decreasing rate of cost-burdened homeowners); id. at 2 (stating
that the FHFA Home Price Index was just 2% below its 2006 high at the end of 2018).
106. See Matthew Yglesias, America’s Dual Housing Crisis and What Democrats Plan to
(July
30,
2019,
8:50
AM),
Do
About
It,
Explained,
VOX
https://www.vox.com/2019/7/30/20681101/housing-crisis-democrats-2020-warren-harrisbooker-castro [https://perma.cc/74FJ-7RDP] (describing affordable housing proposals of
several Democratic candidates and their criticisms of existing policy); Team Warren, My
Housing Plan for America, MEDIUM (Mar. 16, 2019), https://medium.com/@teamwarren/myhousing-plan-for-america-20038e19dc26
[https://perma.cc/K9UM-6K42]
(describing
Senator Warren’s various affordable housing proposals).
107. Yglesias, supra note 106.
108. Down payment assistance programs were selected for analysis because they reflect
the pre-crisis policy of promoting homeownership over renting.
109. Competitive grant programs were chosen for analysis because of bipartisan support
for streamlining land-use and zoning restrictions to make new construction more cost-efficient
and affordable.

2020]

AFFORDABLE HOUSING POLICY

429

construction costs, and spur construction of additional rental and owner
occupancy housing. 110
A.

Down Payment Assistance

Both before and after the financial crisis, American housing
policy has sought to make housing more affordable and increase
household wealth by boosting homeownership. 111 Senators Warren and
Harris both announced plans to increase access to affordable housing by
promoting homeownership among demographic groups with low
homeownership rates. 112 These plans seek to facilitate low- and
moderate-income renter households purchasing homes by subsidizing a
portion of the down payment on a home 113 and targeting minority
households living in “redlined communities.” 114 “Redlining” is the
practice of financial institutions declining to lend to individual or
commercial borrowers in particular neighborhoods based on their
location rather than a borrower’s credit profile. 115 While redlining has
long been a concern, 116 there is renewed emphasis on countering it as the
number of Americans living below the poverty line increases. 117 These
poor Americans are increasingly confined to specific neighborhoods
disproportionately inhabited by certain minority groups, namely AfricanAmericans and Hispanics. 118

110. See Yglesias, supra note 106 (discussing Senators Booker’s and Warren’s respective
proposals for competitive grant programs); Team Warren, supra note 106 (describing a down
payment assistance proposal).
111. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N., supra note 16, at 88 (discussing access to
mortgages and home equity as a “powerful stabilizing force” for households in times of
economic distress in the pre-crisis era).
112. See Team Warren, supra note 106 (discussing Senator Warren’s down payment
subsidy proposal); David Siders, Kamala Harris Proposes $100 Billion Plan for Black
Homeownership,
POLITICO
(July
6,
2019,
1:42
PM),
https://www.politico.com/story/2019/07/06/kamala-harris-homeownership-2020-1399253
[https://perma.cc/ZQ4P-99N2] (discussing Senator Harris’s $100 billion down payment
subsidy program).
113. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
114. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N., supra note 16, at 72.
115. Id.
116. See id. (explaining the aim of combating redlining as a major goal of the Community
Reinvestment Act of 1977).
117. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., supra note 78, at 16 (“Fully 70
percent of poor blacks and 63 percent of poor Hispanics live in high-poverty neighborhoods,
compared with just 35 percent of poor whites and 40 percent of poor Asians.”).
118. Id.
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The underlying interest behind promoting increased
homeownership is the long-held belief that homeownership naturally
leads to increased household wealth by building home equity, the single
largest source of wealth for the majority of Americans. 119 On average,
minority households are much less likely to own a home than White
households, 120 and correspondingly, tend to have less household
wealth. 121 Through the subsidization of down payments, proponents aim
to fuel conversion of cost-burdened, minority renters into homeowners,
with the hope that increased wealth and prosperity will follow. 122
Down payment assistance programs could also bring the ancillary
benefit of reducing the cost of rent. 123 Conversion of renters to
homeowners provides a natural check on increasing rental demand, and
thereby, on rent prices as well. 124 In the years after the financial crisis,
renters converted to homeowners at lower rates than before it. 125 This
slower conversion, along with a general decrease in homeownership, led
to imbalances in the supply and demand of rental housing, which
translated to higher average rent prices. 126 By facilitating increased
conversion to homeownership, down payment assistance programs could
move some existing demand out of the rental market into the home

119. Michael Calhoun, Lessons from The Financial Crisis: The Central Importance of a
Sustainable, Affordable and Inclusive Housing Market, BROOKINGS INST. (Sept. 5, 2018),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/lessons-from-the-financial-crisis-the-centralimportance-of-a-sustainable-affordable-and-inclusive-housing-market/
[https://perma.cc/LM7W-59AH].
120. Laurie Goodman et al., A Closer Look at the Fifteen-Year Drop in Black
Homeownership, URBAN INST.: URBAN WIRE (Feb. 13, 2018), https://www.urban.org/urbanwire/closer-look-fifteen-year-drop-black-homeownership [https://perma.cc/BU8A-7VBZ]
(listing 2016 rates of homeownership among White, African American, and Hispanic
households as 71.3%, 41%, and 45.6%, respectively).
121. See Calhoun, supra note 119 (citing average wealth of African American and
Hispanic families as less than 15% and 20% respectively of that of the average White family).
122. See, e.g., Combatting the Racial Homeownership Gap, KAMALA HARRIS FOR THE
PEOPLE,
https://kamalaharris.org/policies/homeownership-gap/full-policy/
[https://perma.cc/KNP9-WETC] (last visited Sept. 16, 2019) (arguing that equal
homeownership rates among African American and White households would decrease the
racial wealth gap by 31%).
123. See URAHN & PLUNKETT, supra note 2, at 7 (arguing that increased home purchases
expand available supply of rental housing and causes rent prices to drop).
124. See id. (“If the supply of homes for sale can meet or exceed the demand by potential
buyers, experts would expect rental supply to increase and rents to decline.”).
125. Id. at 8.
126. Id. at 7.

2020]

AFFORDABLE HOUSING POLICY

431

purchase market, potentially easing rent prices with more available
supply. 127
These programs would be available to low- and moderate-income
households seeking to purchase a primary residence. 128 Those meeting
requisite income thresholds, less than $100,000 to $125,000 under
Senator Harris’s plan 129 or less than 120% of area-median income under
Senator Warren’s, 130 would be eligible for direct grants to help defray the
cost of a down payment. 131 The amount of assistance granted would vary
on a case-by-case basis and would provide some accommodation for the
dynamics of local housing markets, but would be capped at
predetermined percentages of the value of the property to be purchased—
3.5% 132 and 20% 133 under Warren’s and Harris’s proposals
respectively. 134
Senators Warren and Harris cite minority homeownership as a
central goal of their proposed down payment assistance programs. 135
However, these programs would provide subsidies to households of all
racial and ethnic backgrounds, provided they meet certain
requirements. 136 Both proposals require a minimum residence period,
either current or previous, in a low-income or minority-dominated

127. See id. (“If the supply of homes for sale can meet or exceed the demand by potential
buyers, experts would expect rental supply to increase and rents to decline.”).
128. American Housing Economic and Mobility Act (“AHEMA”), S. 787, 116th Cong. §
201(b)(1) (2019); Combatting the Racial Homeownership Gap, supra note 122.
129. Combatting the Racial Homeownership Gap, supra note 122 (listing the maximum
annual household incomes as $100,000, or $125,000 in high-cost areas, to qualify for down
payment assistance under Senator Harris’s plan).
130. AHEMA, S. 787 § 201(b)(1)(B) (listing the maximum annual household income
eligible for down payment subsidy under Senator Warren’s plan as 120% of area median
income).
131. See id. § 201(d) (providing the maximum amount of down payment assistance under
Senator Warren’s proposal); Combatting the Racial Homeownership Gap, supra note 122
(stating that, under Senator Harris’s proposal, the funds provided could be used to make a
down payment and pay closing costs).
132. AHEMA, S. 787 § 201(d).
133. Combatting the Racial Homeownership Gap, supra note 122.
134. Compare AHEMA, S. 787 § 201(d) (listing the maximum value of grants provided
under Senator Warren’s as 3.5% of the appraised value of the property), with Combatting the
Racial Homeownership Gap, supra note 122 (stating that grants under Senator Harris’s plan
must be no more $25,000 or 20% of total loan value including closing costs).
135. AHEMA, S. 787 § 201(a)(8); Combatting the Racial Homeownership Gap, supra
note 122.
136. AHEMA, S. 787 § 201(a)(8); Combatting the Racial Homeownership Gap, supra
note 122.
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community with a history of racially segregated zoning 137 or redlining. 138
Neither plan would prevent prospective recipients from receiving aid
based on their race or ethnicity, but by making community residence a
prerequisite, certain minority groups would have disproportionate
eligibility in comparison to other ethnicities. 139 Recipients would not be
restricted to purchasing a home in these communities and could instead
use their subsidies to purchase a home in the neighborhood of their
choosing. 140
B.

Competitive Grant Programs

Another common proposal is to confront the affordable housing
shortage through federal grants designed to increase the supply of units
available for affordable housing. 141 The existing supply of affordable
housing has been under consistent downward pressure, and the small
amounts of new development have not been enough to offset this trend,
resulting in consistent net decreases of affordable housing units in recent
years. 142 The supply of low-rent housing units is likely to continue to
decline naturally due to the high proportion of these units in older
buildings nearing the end of their useful lives. 143 The proportion of lowcost rentals in older buildings increased over the past decade, and by
2017, 43% of rentals priced below $800 per month were in buildings at
least fifty years old. 144
Recent development of rental housing units has heavily targeted
higher-income renters and largely ignored both low- and moderate137. See, e.g., AHEMA, S. 787 § 201(g)(1)(B) (listing low-income communities with
historically segregated zoning codes as eligible).
138. Id. § 201(a)(7); id. § 201(g)(1)(B); Combatting the Racial Homeownership Gap,
supra note 122.
139. See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., supra note 78, at 16 (“Fully
70 percent of poor blacks and 63 percent of poor Hispanics live in high-poverty
neighborhoods, compared with just 35 percent of poor whites and 40 percent of poor
Asians.”).
140. See, e.g., AHEMA, S. 787 § 101 (proposing the creation of a competitive grant
program tied to streamlining of land-use and zoning restrictions).
141. See, e.g., Team Warren, supra note 106 (describing Senator Warren’s proposal for
grant funding to municipalities aimed at increasing new construction of affordable housing).
142. See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., supra note 78, at 29 (listing
the total net drop in supply of rental unit prices under $800 per month as four million from
2011–2017).
143. See id. at 30 (describing the high proportion of affordable housing rentals in older
buildings and the associated risk of displacement to residents).
144. Id.
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income demand. 145 The National Multifamily Housing Council noted
that, from 2008 to 2018, less than 3% of new apartments built per year
were affordable for median-income households. 146 With new supply not
meeting the demand of low- and moderate-income renters, sufficiently
affordable housing for these renters is increasingly scarce. 147 More
renters have been pushed into higher cost units that are less affordable
based on their income, but where supply is available. 148 As a result of
this shift, low- and moderate-income renters spend more for housing,
which has significantly contributed to the increase in cost burden. 149
Several Democrats propose to provide funding to state and local
governments through grant programs tied to removal of local land-use
and zoning restrictions that drive up development costs of large
projects. 150 This type of program would not provide direct assistance for
the construction of housing itself, but rather it seeks to boost supply by
making construction of new units cheaper and more efficient. 151 Modern
American land-use and zoning restrictions—controlled by state and local
governments—favor construction of single-family homes. 152 The postcrisis era witnessed a significant population influx to cities and other
urban areas that challenged local housing markets. 153 While rental costs
increased nationally over recent years, 154 costs skyrocketed in markets
that experienced disproportionate population growth as vacancy rates
reached record lows. 155

145. Id. at 29–30.
146. Id. at 30.
147. NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL., THE GAP: A SHORTAGE OF AFFORDABLE HOUSING

3
(2019),
https://reports.nlihc.org/sites/default/files/gap/Gap-Report_2019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EEX4-U7TK].
148. Id. at 5.
149. See URAHN & PLUNKETT, supra note 2 (stating that rental unit vacancy rates near
historic lows have driven rent price increases at faster rates than many households’ incomes).
150. See Passy, supra note 5 (summarizing candidates’ affordable housing proposals).
151. See Edward Glaeser & Joseph Gyourko, The Economic Implications of Housing
Supply, 32 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 6–7 (2018) (discussing the impact of local government land-use
regulation on the cost of housing construction).
152. See Furman, supra note 10, at 7 (describing the development of land-use restrictions
and the population shift from cities to suburbs).
153. See id. at 7 (describing the development of land-use restrictions and the population
shift from cities to suburbs).
154. See URAHN & PLUNKETT, supra note 2, at 6 (stating that national median rent
increased 32% between 2001 and 2015, from $512 per month in 2001 to $678 per month in
2015).
155. See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., supra note 78, at 4–5
(describing the cost burden of renters in the twenty-five highest-cost housing markets).
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Local zoning laws, with their traditional slant toward singlefamily housing, make it more difficult and expensive for new
development to meet the increased demand caused by the post-crisis shift
toward urbanization. 156
Local governments often promulgate
ordinances—such as minimum lot sizes, parking requirements, and
maximum height restrictions—designed to limit population density. 157
These requirements have the effect of limiting new supply of housing
stock by reducing occupancy limits of multifamily developments, thereby
decreasing the number of residents accommodated. 158 To satisfy these
restrictions, developers must build more of these separate, lower capacity
projects on increasingly expensive and scarce land. 159
By offering subsidies to state and local governments, proponents
hope to drive down the cost of development to make new construction
more efficient and economically viable. 160 One way to persuade state and
local governments to choose to participate is to set up competitive grant
programs to allocate significant federal funding for high-cost
expenditures like public education and infrastructure development that
local governments may otherwise struggle to fund on their own. 161 As a
prerequisite to eligibility, the proposals require that state and local
governments modify certain zoning and land-use restrictions to comply
with federal guidance. 162 Proponents hope that through this quid pro quo
approach the potential benefits to municipalities will lead them to forego
their traditional preference for single-family development to make landuse and zoning restrictions conducive to denser development and more
efficient, multifamily housing. 163

156. See Furman, supra note 10, at 7 (describing the development of land-use restrictions
and along with population shift from cities to suburbs).
157. Glaeser & Gyourko, supra note 151, at 6.
158. Id.
159. See id. (describing the negative effect of density restrictions on housing supply).
160. See Team Warren, supra note 106 (describing Senator Warren’s proposal for grant
funding to municipalities aimed at increasing new construction of affordable housing).
161. American Housing Economic and Mobility Act (“AHEMA”), S. 787 § 101(c), 116th
Cong. (1st Sess. 2019).
162. See id. § 101(d) (describing the requirements for applicants to the proposed grant
program); Team Warren, supra note 106 (describing Senator Warren’s proposal for grant
funding to municipalities aimed at increasing new construction of affordable housing).
163. See Furman, supra note 10, at 7 (describing the development of land-use restrictions
and the population shift from cities to suburbs).
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IV. ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM
A.

Down Payment Assistance

Proposed down payment assistance programs would be widereaching, for example, Senator Harris’s proposal could benefit as many
as four million prospective home buyers, 164 but at an estimated $100
billion cost. 165 Down payment assistance is just one component of
Senator Warren’s proposed American Housing and Economic Mobility
Act (“AHEMA”). 166 The Bill apportions roughly $500 billion 167 over ten
years to a variety of programs designed to increase access to affordable
housing. 168 Proponents claim the AHEMA would be deficit neutral 169
and cite an independent economic analysis performed by Moody’s
Analytics as confirmation that the Bill’s proposed estate tax changes 170
will offset the $500 billion price tag. 171 The Moody’s report found that
the AHEMA could bolster the economy by adding as many as 1.5 million
new construction jobs and asserted the estate tax changes would have
relatively little economic impact as they would not force changes in the
saving or consumption behavior of those impacted. 172
However, the AHEMA’s nearly $500 billion price tag likely fails
to include the cost of its down payment assistance program. 173 While the
Bill proposes explicit dollar value appropriations for other programs, 174
164. Siders, supra note 112.
165. Combatting the Racial Homeownership Gap, supra note 122.
166. See, e.g., AHEMA, S. 787 § 201 (“Down payment assistance program for

communities formerly segregated by law”); id. § 101 (“Local housing innovation grants.”).
167. The AHEMA specifically enumerates appropriations totaling $492.623 billion. Id. §
101(f) (appropriating $10 billion); id. § 102(a) (appropriating $445 billion); id. at § 102(b)
(appropriating $25 billion); id. § 102(c) (appropriating $3.592 billion); id. § 102(d)
(appropriating $2.5 billion); id. at § 102(e) (appropriating $8 million); id. § 102(f)
(appropriating $523 million); id. § 102(g) (appropriating $4 billion); id. § 202(c)
(appropriating $2 billion).
168. ZANDI, supra note 3, at 2.
169. Team Warren, supra note 106.
170. See infra Part IV.B.
171. ZANDI, supra note 3, at 2 (stating that AHEMA’s proposed changes to the estate tax
will offset roughly $400 billion of the bill’s $500 billion price tag while increased economic
activity will offset the remaining $100 billion).
172. Id.
173. See American Housing Economic and Mobility Act (“AHEMA”), S. 787 § 201(h),
116th Cong. (1st Sess. 2019) (proposing a non-specific allocation of funds as necessary to the
down payment assistance program).
174. See, e.g., id. § 102(b) (proposing to allocate $25 billion annually to the Capital
Management Fund from 2020 through 2029).
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the AHEMA proposes to allocate “such sums as may be necessary for
each of fiscal years 2020 through 2029 to provide grants under this
section and to carry out consumer education efforts related to this
section” to its down payment assistance program. 175 Additionally, the
AHEMA does not define a precise criteria for the low-income and
minority-dominated communities of which residency is a prerequisite;
instead, it calls for the creation of databases and regulations to make these
determinations. 176 Without the data or criteria necessary to determine the
number of households potentially eligible for assistance under such a
program, reliable estimates of the total cost and deficit impact are
unavailable. 177
Beyond the monetary expense, down payment assistance
programs carry other significant implications for the broader economy. 178
While subsidies alone could put homeownership within reach of some,
prospective home buyers must still obtain mortgage financing for the rest
of the purchase price. 179 The cost of down payments does prevent many
low- and moderate-income households from obtaining mortgages, 180 but
those costs are far from the only requirement for mortgage
qualification. 181 For example, poor credit history would prevent many
renters from obtaining mortgage financing even with down payment
assistance. 182
Since the collapse of the housing market and 2008 financial crisis,
lenders generally adhere to more conservative lending practices and show
175. Id. § 201(h).
176. Id. § 201(g).
177. See id. § 201(h) (proposing to allocate funds as needed to support the proposed down

payment assistance program); id. § 201(g) (proposing qualification that criteria and required
data be determined after passage of the Bill).
178. See Damian Paletta, Federal Government Has Dramatically Expanded Exposure to
POST
(Oct.
3,
2019,
5:34
PM),
Risky
Mortgages,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/federal-government-has-dramaticallyexpanded-exposure-to-risky-mortgages/2019/10/02/d862ab40-ce79-11e9-87fa8501a456c003_story.html [https://perma.cc/Q2J3-D7MJ] (quoting a Fannie Mae regulatory
filing stating that its efforts to provide credit for purchases of affordable housing has exposed
it to increased credit risk).
179. See URAHN & PLUNKETT, supra note 2, at 4 (describing the inability of some to afford
homeownership with down payment assistance).
180. See generally id. (describing the inability of some to afford homeownership even with
down payment assistance).
181. See id. (describing the role of strict credit standards in preventing access to home
purchases).
182. See id. (stating that while the financial situation of many households whose home
were foreclosed on during the housing crisis has improved, many are still not deemed
creditworthy by lenders).
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a marked aversion to the type of credit risks they embraced in the early
2000s. 183 Government backing is more crucial to the mortgage market
than ever before, with 65% of all outstanding single-family mortgage
debt backed by some type of government guarantee. 184 As a result,
lenders overwhelmingly tend to make loans that conform to requirements
for some type of government backing. 185 Indeed, in 2019, the U.S.
Government backed more mortgage debt than ever before, around $7
trillion in total. 186 The prevalence of FHA insured mortgages increased
dramatically after the financial crisis, insuring 10.9% of mortgage debt in
2017, compared to just 3.14% in 2007. 187 Private lenders also rely
heavily on GSE purchases of the mortgage loans they originate as a
means to offload the associated credit risk and primarily originate loans
conforming to the GSEs’ purchase standards. 188
While lenders’ growing reliance on government mortgage
backing is partially attributable to their own post-crisis risk aversion,
regulatory changes have also contributed to this shift. 189 The Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank
Act”) 190 amended the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) 191 to require
mortgage lenders to make “a reasonable and good faith determination” 192
of prospective borrowers’ “ability to repay” a mortgage on the terms
provided before extending credit. 193 The statutory amendment creates a
presumption of the borrower’s ability to repay when the lender extends a
“qualified mortgage.” 194 The Dodd-Frank Act designated authority for
183. See Paletta, supra note 178 (describing increasing rates of FHA insured mortgages).
184. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, HOUSING REFORM PLAN: PURSUANT TO THE PRESIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM
ISSUED
MARCH
27,
2019,
at
34
(2019),
https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/Treasury-Housing-Finance-Reform-Plan.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RQ79-TDSP].
185. See Paletta, supra note 178 (describing lenders’ conformity to Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac mortgage purchase standards when making loans).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. See id. (discussing the Dodd-Frank Act’s requirement that lenders account for
borrowers’ “ability to repay” a loan).
190. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”), Pub.
L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
191. Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”), Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968).
192. Dodd-Frank § 1411(a)(2), 15 U.S.C § 1639c(b)(1) (2018).
193. Id.; see also Ability-to-Repay and Qualified Mortgage Standards Under the Truth in
Lending Act (“Regulation Z”), 78 Fed. Reg. 6408, 6408 (Jan. 30, 2013) (codified at 12 C.F.R.
pt. 1026) (implementing the Dodd-Frank Act’s amendments to TILA).
194. Dodd-Frank § 1411(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(b)(1) (2018).

438

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 24

the ability-to-repay and qualified mortgage requirements to the newly
created Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”), 195 which
promulgated regulations that went into effect in 2014. 196 As part of the
ability-to-repay determination, the CFPB requires lenders calculate debtto-income (“DTI”) 197 ratios of prospective borrowers. 198
Loans
originated by private lenders that result in a borrower’s DTI ratio
exceeding 43% are deemed non-qualified mortgages, resulting in the
regulatory presumption that the borrower is unable to repay the loan on
the terms provided. 199 Private lenders may still originate non-qualifying
mortgages but are burdened to establish that they adequately assessed the
borrower’s ability to repay before originating the loan by examining the
borrower’s income, assets, employment status, outstanding debts, and
credit history. 200
Under a CFPB exemption, known as the “GSE patch,” 201 loans
conforming to Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac underwriting standards are
exempt from the typical DTI calculations, and lenders may make
conforming loans to borrowers with DTI ratios in excess of the 43%
statutory threshold that are still classified as qualified mortgages with a
presumption that the borrower is able to repay. 202 Loans insured by
federal agencies such as the FHA, Department of Veterans Affairs
(“VA”), and Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) are also classified as
qualified mortgages and are exempt from the DTI calculation under a
separate regulatory allowance. 203 As a result, recently originated
government-backed mortgages have higher DTI ratios than
nonconforming or non-federally insured mortgages. 204 Indeed, in 2018,
195. Ability-to-Repay and Qualified Mortgage Standards Under the Truth in Lending Act
(“Regulation Z”), 78 Fed. at 6408.
196. Id.
197. The DTI calculation examines a prospective borrower’s existing monthly debt
obligations plus the additional payments and fees required as part of the loan sought in
comparison to total monthly income. Id.
198. 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(e)(2)(vi) (2019).
199. Id. § 1026.43(e)(2)(vi); Ability-to-Repay and Qualified Mortgage Standards Under
the Truth in Lending Act (“Regulation Z”), 78 Fed. at 6409.
200. 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(c)(2).
201. Id. § 1026.43(e)(4)(ii).
202. Id. § 1026.43(e)(4)(ii)(A).
203. Id. § 1026.43(e)(4)(ii)(B)–(E).
204. See KARAN KAUL & LAURIE GOODMAN, WHAT, IF ANYTHING, SHOULD REPLACE THE
QM
GSE
PATCH?,
at
2
(Urban
Inst.
2018),
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/98949/qualified_mortgage_rule_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U5G9-Z5T8] (describing higher debt-to-income ratios among government
backed mortgages compared to bank portfolio mortgages).
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29% of newly originated Fannie Mae conforming mortgages and 55% of
FHA insured mortgages were made to borrowers with DTI ratios in
excess of the CFPB’s 43% threshold currently in place for a private loan
to be classified as a qualified mortgage. 205 The Urban Institute attributes
this increase in DTI among government-backed mortgages to the faster
appreciation in home prices in comparison to wages, forcing prospective
home buyers to borrow more in order to purchase homes at increased
prices. 206
As home prices continue to appreciate at rates outstripping wage
207
growth,
the low- and moderate-income households—which down
payment assistance proposals seek to help— would likewise purchase
homes with higher valuations, requiring larger mortgages that correlate
to higher DTI ratios for these prospective borrowers. 208 Under the
CFPB’s ability-to-pay requirement, low- and moderate-income
borrowers rely disproportionately on government-backed mortgages not
subject to the same debt-to-income calculation thanks to the GSE
patch. 209 CoreLogic data shows that the GSE patch facilitated more than
$205 billion of mortgages in 2018 to borrowers with DTI ratios exceeding
43%, 210 making up roughly 12.6% of the year’s total mortgage
originations. 211
The GSE patch was intended as a temporary measure to ensure
short-term access to mortgage credit while private lenders adjusted to the
qualified mortgage rule. 212 However, since the CFPB implemented the
ability-to-pay regulation in 2014, lenders have been reticent to issue nonqualified mortgages largely due to possible regulator and borrower
retaliation for inadequate verification of the borrower’s ability to repay
205.
206.
207.
208.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See generally id. (attributing borrowers’ higher debt-to-income ratios to the
disproportionate growth in home prices over wages).
209. See Pradhan, supra note 7 (showing that low- and moderate-income borrowers have
account for significantly more GSE patch mortgages than high-income borrowers); Paletta,
supra note 178 (describing the duty of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to ensure access to credit
to those groups that traditionally have experienced limited access to credit markets).
210. See Pete Carroll, Expiration of the CFPB’s Qualified Mortgage “GSE Patch” – Part
1,
CORELOGIC:
INSIGHTS
BLOG
(July
11,
2019),
https://www.corelogic.com/blog/2019/07/expiration-of-the-cfpbs-qualified-mortgage-gsepatch-part-1.aspx [https://perma.cc/56YU-RTHG] (showing that 12.6% of the $1.63 trillion
of mortgages originated in 2018 were facilitated by the GSE patch as the borrowers had DTI
ratios exceeding 43%).
211. Id.
212. Id.
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in the event of a default. 213 The TILA provides non-qualified mortgage
borrowers a private right of action against lenders for a violation of the
ability-to-repay requirement, and they may seek monetary damages or
use the violation as a defense against foreclosure. 214 This private right of
action also applies to subsequent purchasers of a loan, 215 and this
potential liability makes the purchase of non-qualified mortgages less
attractive to investors. 216
As a result, the market for private label MBS, which are
comprised primarily of non-qualified mortgages, is miniscule in
comparison to before the financial crisis. 217 In 2006, private label MBS
issuance amounted to $1.27 trillion, surpassing the combined value of
GSE and Ginnie Mae MBS issuance. 218 In 2018 by contrast, private label
MBS amounted to just $181.4 billion, less than 15% of the 2006 value. 219
Since the 2014 implementation of the ability-to-pay requirement, the
majority of non-qualified mortgages private lenders make to borrowers
exceeding the 43% DTI threshold are jumbo mortgages 220 made to
financially secure borrowers. 221 Jumbo mortgage borrowers tend to have
higher incomes and are generally more creditworthy than borrowers of
smaller nonconforming loans, making it easier to establish their ability to
repay their loans. 222
The existing GSE patch is set to expire in 2021, 223 and the CFPB
currently opposes its extension. 224 Without the patch, Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac conforming loans resulting in greater than 43% DTI ratios
213. See KAUL & GOODMAN, supra note 204, at 3 (discussing the $10-$20 billion per year
size of the non-qualified mortgage market in comparison to the 1.8 trillion total mortgage
market annually).
214. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (2018); id. § 1640(k).
215. Id. § 1640(k).
216. U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, supra note 184, at 3.
217. Id.
218. SEC. INDUS. AND FIN. MKT. ASS’N, supra note 59, tbl.2.1.
219. Id.
220. Jumbo loans are large mortgages whose values exceed the maximum amount eligible
for Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac purchase. What Is A Jumbo Loan, CONSUMER FIN.
PROTECTION BUREAU (Feb. 24, 2017), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/ask-cfpb/what-is-ajumbo-loan-en-116/ [https://perma.cc/7W53-JMHE].
221. KAUL & GOODMAN, supra note 204, at 2–3.
222. Id.
223. 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(e)(4)(iii)(B) (2019); Qualified Mortgage Definition under the
Truth in Lending Act (“Regulation Z”), 84 Fed. Reg. 37155, 37155 (proposed July 25, 2019)
(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1026) (stating that the CFPB currently plans to allow the GSE
patch to expire in 2021).
224. Qualified Mortgage Definition under the Truth in Lending Act (“Regulation Z”), 84
Fed. Reg. at 37155 (stating the CFPB currently plans to allow the GSE patch expire in 2021).
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will be treated as non-qualified mortgages. 225 With the looming
expiration of the GSE patch, mortgage credit for low- and moderateincome borrowers is likely to contract, even with receipt of down
payment assistance. 226 Lenders will be required to subject prospective
borrowers to ability-to-repay and debt-to-income analysis, and a violation
carries the same potential liability which impacted demand for existing
non-qualified mortgages and could restrict credit to low- and moderateincome borrowers. 227 Under the proposed down payment assistance
programs, there could be millions more prospective borrowers seeking
mortgages resulting high debt-to-income ratios. 228
Once the GSE patch expires, two significant sources of mortgage
funding, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, will likely be unable to serve this
need on the same scale, because conforming mortgages will be subject to
more stringent ability-to-repay analysis; those with DTI ratios in excess
of 43% will be non-qualified. 229 The low- and moderate-income
households that down payment assistance proposals seek to help purchase
homes are the groups most likely to see mortgage credit restricted with
the expiration of the GSE patch. 230 Potential liability for insufficient
verification of a borrower’s ability-to-repay imposed on lenders and
successive owners of non-qualified mortgages has drastically reduced the
volumes of high DTI non-qualified mortgages originated and investor
demand for existing non-conforming loans, and this is likely to make high
DTI conforming loans similarly unattractive to investors. 231 Given
weakened demand for non-qualifying mortgages and the resulting vast
reduction of the private label MBS market since the financial crisis,
mortgage credit to low- and moderate-income borrowers is likely to be
restricted without the GSE patch, severely limiting the efficacy of down
payment assistance programs. 232
225. KAUL & GOODMAN, supra note 204, at 3.
226. See id. (discussing the possible disruption to the mortgage market when the qualified

mortgage patch expires in 2021).
227. Id.
228. See Siders, supra note 112 (stating that the proposed down payment assistance plan
could impact as many as four million people); KAUL & GOODMAN, supra note 204, at 2–3.
229. See KAUL & GOODMAN, supra note 204, at 2–3 (discussing the possible disruption to
the mortgage market when the qualified mortgage patch expires in 2021).
230. See Pradhan, supra note 7 (showing that low- and moderate-income borrowers have
to account for significantly more GSE patch mortgages than high-income borrowers).
231. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, supra note 184, at 3.
232. KAUL & GOODMAN, supra note 204, at 7 (discussing the possible disruption to the
mortgage market when the qualified mortgage patch expires in 2021).
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Competitive Grant Programs

To affect wide-spread land-use and zoning restriction at the
municipal level, federal grant programs require substantial investment to
ensure they are able to provide funding sufficient for the types of highcost projects state and locals governments struggle to finance
independently. 233 As proposed, Senator Elizabeth Warren’s AHEMA
includes a provision for this type of grant program and allocates a total of
$10 billion in funding. 234 Funding for a competitive grant program would
likely come from tax increases, like the substantial changes to the estate
tax scheme Senator Warren proposes to fund AHEMA. 235
Proponents of the implementing estate tax changes to fund the
proposal point to the relatively small number of households affected by
the changes proposed under the AHEMA, noting that rolling back the
2018 estate tax exemptions to the higher 2009 levels would impact
roughly 14,000 “high-income” families annually. 236 The Bill would
lower the basic estate tax exclusion to $3.5 million 237 from the current
$10 million exclusion. 238 Under the existing tax code, the highest
marginal estate tax rate is 40% for estates with a taxable value exceeding
$1 million 239 By contrast, the AHEMA adds three new estate tax
brackets: 55% on estates with taxable values between $1 million and $13
million, 60% on those valued between $13 million and $93 million, and
65% on those valued in excess of $93 million. 240 In addition, the Bill
adds a separate 241 “billionaires’ surtax” of 10% of the value of an estate
plus the value of gifts on estates with taxable values exceeding $1
billion. 242

233. Yglesias, supra note 106.
234. American Housing Economic and Mobility Act (“AHEMA”), S. 787 § 101(f), 116th

Cong. (1st Sess. 2019) (proposing to allocate $2 billion per year to grant programs between
2020 and 2024).
235. Id. § 402.
236. Team Warren, supra note 106.
237. AHEMA, S. 787 § 402(b).
238. 26 U.S.C. § 2010(c)(3) (2018).
239. Id. § 2001(c).
240. AHEMA, S. 787 § 402(a).
241. The “billionaires’ surtax” contained in the AHEMA’s estate tax reforms is separate
from the annual “ultra-millionaire tax” also proposed by Senator Warren. Ultra-Millionaire
Tax, WARREN, https://elizabethwarren.com/ultra-millionaire-tax/ [https://perma.cc/275H3PXQ] (last visited Oct. 26, 2019).
242. AHEMA, S. 787 § 402(c).
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Supporters of the competitive grant approach point to zoning and
land-use regulations as an artificial constraint on housing supply. 243
These restrictions replace the normal market forces that lead developers
to determine how much and what types of housing stock to create with
regulatory restraints that impede their ability to build the high-density
housing that can more cost-efficiently meet actual demand. 244 With the
post-crisis decrease in homeownership and the corresponding shift to
renting, zoning and land-use restrictions targeting multifamily
developments present especially onerous barriers to adequately meeting
consumer preferences and needs. 245
Not all observers believe such measures would be effective. 246
Critics suggest that while federal subsidies may accomplish the removal
of some specific land-use and zoning regulations, they will not achieve
their overall goal of boosting affordable housing construction. 247
Ultimately, the land-use and zoning regulations that weigh so heavily on
the cost of developments are within the exclusive purview of local and
state governments. 248 While the federal government may use subsidy
programs to influence local policymaking, it does not have any direct
control over local government actions. 249 The federal government would
have little recourse against local governments that remove offensive
regulations in order to qualify for grant money and subsequently enact
other restrictions designed to impede construction of affordable housing
after receiving a grant, thereby honoring the letter but violating the spirit
of the program. 250
Local control of land-use and zoning restrictions does present an
additional layer of complexity to a federal government solution, 251 but it
also presents some benefits as well. 252 Housing needs and costs vary
243. Furman, supra note 10.
244. See id. (describing zoning and land-use restrictions as a supply constraint).
245. See generally Furman, supra note 10 (describing zoning and land-use restrictions as

an artificial barrier to adequately meeting a market’s housing demand).
246. See e.g., Yglesias, supra note 106 (describing the opportunity to remove certain landuse restrictions to ensure eligibility for grant money while taking other actions to prevent
development).
247. Id.
248. Furman, supra note 10, at 7.
249. Yglesias, supra note 106.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. See Vanessa Brown Calder, Zoning, Land-Use Planning, and Housing Affordability,
CATO INST. (Oct. 18, 2017), https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/zoning-landuse-planning-housing-affordability [https://perma.cc/7769-7SSE] (discussing local decisions
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significantly between markets, making it impossible for a monolithic
federal policy to meet the particular needs of all areas. 253 Competitive
grant programs will provide powerful incentives for local governments to
assess their individual housing challenges with a unique understanding of
the market that a federal agency cannot match. 254
Moreover, removal of costly zoning and land-use restrictions can
have positive effects on the housing market as a whole, potentially
lowering costs across all price points. 255 Even with eased land-use
requirements, many developers may continue to focus on higher-cost,
market-rate housing in order to maximize profit. 256 However, additional
market-rate development has the potential to reduce the costs of low- and
moderate-cost housing. 257 While housing is a long-lived asset, it loses
value over time and formerly high-end units cannot command the same
high rents and purchase prices. 258 As units age and their rental or
purchase value diminishes, they naturally shift from higher- to lower-cost
in a process known as “downward filtering.” 259 From 2003 to 2013,
downward filtering accounted for the majority of additional affordable
housing rentals nationwide, while the majority of high-cost rentals came
from new construction. 260 Conversely, in the absence of sufficient
development of market-rate housing or corresponding demand decreases,
“upward filtering” occurs when owners of existing units improve their
properties and increase prices to take advantage of the unmet demand for
more expensive housing. 261 Upward filtering is a frequent occurrence in
to remove land-use restrictions as a more efficient means of addressing shortages of affordable
housing).
253. Yglesias, supra note 106.
254. Calder, supra note 252.
255. See Vicki Been, City Nimbys, 33 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 217, 244 (2018)
(describing the role of newly constructed housing in absorbing demand on existing supply in
an area).
256. See ZANDI, supra note 3 (describing developers’ tendency to build high-cost
housing).
257. See Christopher Serkin, Divergence in Land Use Regulations and Property Rights,
92 S. CAL. L. REV. 1055, 1067 (2019) (explaining that increased supply of any type of housing
will likely decrease demand and therefore price for another type of housing within a
geographic market).
258. See VICKI BEEN ET AL., SUPPLY SKEPTICISM: HOUSING SUPPLY AND AFFORDABILITY 6
(NYU Furman Ctr. 2018), https://furmancenter.org/files/Supply_Skepticism_-_Final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DF62-JLYK] (describing the decline in rent value of older housing when
there is new market rate construction in the market).
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
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high-cost markets, like the San Francisco Bay Area, where significant
zoning and land-use restrictions make it cost prohibitive for developers
to adequately respond to demand for new construction. 262 Even if new
development concentrates on high-cost units, the increased supply of
these units will accelerate downward filtering of existing units to lower
price points and satisfy demand of low- and moderate-income
households. 263
Furthermore, unlike other schemes for direct federal
subsidization of new construction, 264 measures to streamline zoning and
land-use restrictions have widespread, bipartisan support. 265 In 2019,
President Trump created the White House Council on Eliminating
Regulatory Barriers to Affordable Housing to examine zoning and landuse restrictions that drive up development costs and make
recommendations to facilitate more cost-effective development. 266
Zoning reform is one of the rare areas today where the Trump
Administration and Democratic politicians share common ground, and
their joint support make competitive grant programs a realistic way to
impact housing affordability. 267
V. CONCLUSION
While consistent increases in home prices over the past decade
place national home prices within striking distance of their 2006 peak, 268
the housing market is fundamentally different today than before the
financial crisis. 269 The unprecedented credit expansion from the 1980s

262. Id.
263. See Serkin, supra note 257 (explaining that increased supply of any type of housing

will likely decrease demand and therefore price for another type of housing within a
geographic market).
264. See, e.g., Team Warren, supra note 106 (describing Senator Warren’s plan for federal
subsidization of public housing projects).
265. See Exec. Order No. 13878, Establishing a White House Council on eliminating
Regulatory Barriers to Affordable Housing, 84 Fed. Reg. 30853, 30853 (June 25, 2019),
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-06-28/pdf/2019-14016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5P2W-FYLC] (citing restrictive zoning as a key contributor to shortages of
affordable housing).
266. Id. at 30853–54.
267. See Yglesias, supra note 106 (listing prominent Democratic candidates and Trump
administration officials that support zoning reform).
268. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N., supra note 16, at 214.
269. Compare URAHN & PLUNKETT, supra note 2, at 8 (analyzing increased rental
participation among the eighteen to thirty-four and fifty-five plus age groups); with FIN. CRISIS
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through the early 2000s allowed low- and moderate-income Americans,
who had previously been unable to access mortgage credit, to purchase
homes. 270 This credit expansion drove home prices to an all-time high
and effectively created new demand for homeownership from those who
otherwise would have rented. 271 As home prices increased, real estate
developers boosted construction of new residential housing in an attempt
to profit from the new demand for homes, 272 until the supply of homes
eventually exceeded demand and prices plummeted in 2007. 273
In contrast to the appreciation of home prices during the early
2000s, the climb of home values is attributable to insufficient supply
rather than increased demand for homes. 274 Homeownership rates have
decreased since the 2008 financial crisis, leading to increased demand for
rental housing and a significant increase in rent prices nationwide. 275
Today, action is needed to address that the costs of both rent and
homeownership are unaffordable to large numbers of Americans. 276
Down payment assistance programs could convert existing
renters into homeowners and provide them with future financial
prosperity through the accretion of home equity. 277 This type of plan
represents the traditional American policy preference for promoting
homeownership over renting 278 and could help remaining renters by
shifting some demand out of the rental market into the home purchase
market. 279 While an admirable goal, down payment assistance proposals
overlook the post-crisis regulation that changed the mortgage market and
would likely prevent many recipients from qualifying for mortgage
financing once the GSE patch expires in 2021. 280 Providing down
INQUIRY COMM’N., supra note 16, at 214 (describing the pre-crisis peak rates of
homeownership).
270. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N., supra note 16, at 83 (listing the increase in average
American household debt from 80% of disposable income in 1993 to roughly 130% in 2006).
271. Id. at 214 (describing the 2006 peak of the American housing market).
272. See id. at 5 (“Housing starts nationwide climbed 53%, from 1.4 million in 1995 to
more than 2 million in 2005.”).
273. See id. at 389–90 (describing excess housing supply and the effect on housing prices).
274. URAHN & PLUNKETT, supra note 2.
275. Id.
276. See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., supra note 78, at 29–30
(describing the increasing cost-burden of renters); id. at 2 (describing increase in ratio of
median home price to median household income).
277. Calhoun, supra note 119.
278. See Boyack, supra note 22, at 111 (describing the need for rent-friendly policy
alternatives to typical “American Dream of homeownership” based policies).
279. URAHN & PLUNKETT, supra note 2.
280. Pradhan, supra note 7.
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payment assistance could help some low- and moderate-income
Americans purchase houses, but with entry prices so high, any decrease
in home prices during an economic downturn could devastate buyers and
do more harm than good to the people these programs intend to help. 281
Additionally, these plans overlook the fact that significant increases in
home prices over the past decade make the high monthly payments of a
mortgage unaffordable to many of the intended recipients, 282 which begs
the question of whether the plans really address housing affordability or
just promote further homeownership.
While competitive grant programs tied to zoning reform have
their drawbacks, 283 they seek to remove regulations that prevent housing
supply from meeting actual demand. 284 The number of renters has
steadily increased since the financial crisis because fewer renters
purchased homes. 285 With the expiration of the GSE patch and the
potential for a resulting tightening of mortgage credit, home purchases
could slow and cause rental demand to accelerate even further. 286 Given
the current shortages of both rental and owner-occupancy housing, 287
measures to facilitate denser, more cost-effective construction are
preferable as they address the specific housing supply challenges the
nation faces. 288 Politicians seeking to address the high cost of housing
would be better served to focus on solutions like competitive grant
programs that could improve supply of all types of housing rather than
those like down payment assistance that look to artificially shift demand
from one market to another. 289
THOMAS E. WALLS *
281. See Paletta, supra note 178 (describing the dangers of providing access to credit in
potentially adverse markets).
282. URAHN & PLUNKETT, supra note 2.
283. See Yglesias, supra note 106 (describing the lack of federal control over zoning and
land-use restrictions).
284. See Furman, supra note 10, at 3 (describing zoning and land-use restrictions as a
supply constraint).
285. URAHN & PLUNKETT, supra note 2.
286. See id. (describing the negative impact of mortgage credit tightening on home sales).
287. See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., supra note 78, at 29–30
(describing increasing cost-burden of renters); id. at 2 (describing increase in ratio of median
home price to median household income).
288. See Furman, supra note 10, at 3 (describing zoning and land-use restrictions as a
supply constraint).
289. See URAHN & PLUNKETT, supra note 2 (discussing the relationship of rental market
demand on that of the market for home purchases).
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